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The purpose and main scope of this paper is to focus on the types of specific conduct with 
potential issues, the standards for them, and the applicable factors to be considered that were 
provided with respect to the exercise of patent rights-related technology standards in the Review 
Guidelines on the Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Right (IPR Guidelines), review the 
methods to identify the types of such conduct and relevance of such proposed standards, and 
propose alternatives thereto. 
This paper concludes with suggestions as follows: Firstly, the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) will use its guidelines as a primary framework to enforce the Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) by the KFTC officials even though it has no legislative basis; 
therefore, it is very important to carefully review its contents. Secondly, in order to regulate 
non-disclosure of relevant patent technology under the MRFTA, the IPR Guidelines needs to 
specifically provide that both the intent and effect of the non-disclosure on the standard setting 
process are required. Thirdly, provisions on imposing unreasonable or discriminatory royalties 
should be improved to take necessary considerations into account, provide specific factors or 
standards under the special circumstances where the patented technology is included in a 
standard. Fourthly, whether procedures for the disclosure of patent information and the ex ante 
negotiation for licensing terms have been complied with, which are provided as important 
factors to be considered in judging illegality, does not bear causation or close relationship with 
the violation of the MRFTA and failure to comply with such procedures should not be 
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considered more seriously than other factors. Lastly, the standard for determining whether an 
FRAND-encumbered SEP holder’s filing for injunctive relief may be anti-competitive can be 
considered acceptable compared with the recent practical developments in other jurisdictions.
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I. Purpose and Scope of the Research
The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in Article 59 
provides that the Act shall not apply to any conduct that is acknowledged 
to be legitimate exercise of rights under the Patent Law. The provision 
declares the principle that a conduct deemed to be exercise of patent rights 
is subject to the application of the Act in case that the conduct is out of 
scope of legitimate exercise of patent rights. When it comes to the 
interpretation of the term ‘legitimate exercise’, the Supreme Court of Korea 
ruled that a conduct that is out of scope of legitimate exercise of patent 
rights means that its substance is against the intrinsic purpose of patent 
system beyond the spirit of the system.1) Based on the principle referred to 
above, the Review Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR Guidelines) states that it presents general principles and 
specific standards for the application of the MRFTA with respect to the 
exercise of intellectual property rights, with a focus on patents. The IPR 
Guidelines was enacted initially by the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) on August 2000 and wholly amended on March 2010 to explicitly 
include foreign businesses in the scope of application of the Guidelines and 
cover recently raised issues in connection with intellectual property rights, 
such as patent pools, technology standards, and the abuse of patent 
litigation.  Most recently, the KFTC amended the Guidelines on December 
2014 to establish IPR abuse by a Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) and Standard-
Essential Patent (SEP) holders as separate categories of IPR abuse.
1) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter GSK Case].
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Chapter II. ‘General Review Principles’ of the IPR Guidelines suggests a 
common basis for understanding the purpose of the intellectual property 
rights system and the MRFTA; however, it has flaws by seeking such 
common basis not from the protection of competition serving as a direct 
objective but from the promotion of innovative business activities and 
sound development of the national economy serving as ultimate objectives. 
Such approach in the IPR Guidelines fails to recognize the general 
understanding that the intellectual property rights system and the MRFTA 
share the same fundamental purpose of enhancing consumer welfare and 
promoting innovation.2) An explanation that the intellectual property rights 
system promotes creative business activities and sound development of the 
national economy and related industry is too abstract and general and thus 
not sufficient to provide any normative elements to be considered in 
determining illegality and establishing specific standards.3) As a result, the 
IPR Guidelines falls short of providing the countervailing elements 
reflecting the characteristics of the intellectual property rights system to 
promote consumer welfare and technology innovation, which should be 
balanced against the elements indicating the illegality in Chapter II, Article 
3, which also affects the way in which the specific types of conduct with 
potential issues in Chapter III are identified.  
However, by shifting the framework for analysis from the fair trade 
hindering effect including unfairness to the anti-competitive effect, the 
amended IPR Guidelines makes sure that it is now focused on setting 
standards of illegality consistent with those applied by the US antitrust 
laws or the EU competition laws. The IPR Guidelines’ recognition of the 
characteristics of the intellectual property rights system can be found in 
sections explaining that the characteristics of the technology market will be 
considered in defining relevant market and that the efficiency enhancing 
2) U.s. department of JUstice and the federal trade commission, antitrUst enforcement 
and intellectUal property riGhts: promotinG innovation and competition 1 (2007), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearing/ip/222655.pdf.
3) In contrast, it is possible to deduce from the purposes of promotion of consumer 
welfare and technological innovation normative elements that may be meaningfully 
considered in judgment of illegality. Technological innovation in particular is an element of 
competition and standard of achievement in dynamic competition that can serve as a 
standard for the application of the MRFTA. 
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effect will be considered in assessing illegality. However, in this case, the 
IPR Guidelines requires that such efficiency enhancing effect should 
contribute to promote consumer welfare and the overall efficiency of the 
national economy as well as saving the internal cost of parties concerned; 
therefore, it reduces room for considering efficiency enhancing effect in 
assessing illegality.
The IPR Guidelines in Chapter III categorizes the exercise of intellectual 
property rights and identifies specific conduct that raises concern and the 
standard for assessment of illegality per each category. To be specific, 
Article 5 ‘Exercise of Patent Rights related to Technology Standards’, 
among specific types of exercise of intellectual property rights listed in 
Chapter III, provides both the conduct-specific standards and the factors to 
be considered to identify potential ex post opportunism by patent holders or 
patent applicants with regard to patents included in standards adopted by 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs), and to determine the anti-
competitive effect that may be caused by such conduct. 
The purpose and main scope of this paper is to focus on the types of 
specific conducts with potential issues, the standards for them, and the 
applicable factors to be considered that were provided with respect to the 
exercise of patent rights related to technology standards in the IPR 
Guidelines, review the methods to identify the types of such conducts and 
relevance of such proposed standards, and propose alternatives thereto. 
The paper clarifies the areas where recognition of legitimate competition 
law concerns is warranted and where legal intervention by the competition 
authority may be allowed with respect to the exercise of patent rights 
related to technology standards thereby facilitating more efficient allocation 
of useful resources for enforcement. Additionally, within the scope 
necessary for the research, this research is intended to review the illegality 
standard for abuse of market dominance which the IPR Guidelines seeks to 
apply to the exercise of patent rights related to the technology standards, 
and based on such a review, to specify more concretely and clearly the 
contents and standards for determining the anti-competitive effect, which is 
the general principle of illegality proposed by the IPR Guidelines. 
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II.  Contents of IPR Guidelines on the Exercise of the 
Standard-related Patents
1. Overview
This section intends to review contents of the IPR Guidelines Chapter III 
‘Specific Standard’, Article 5 ‘Exercise of the Patent Rights related to the 
Technology Standard’. In particular, among the specified types of conduct, 
non-disclosure of related patent information, discrimination in license 
conditions, and imposition of unreasonable license fees will be analyzed. In 
addition, newly added types of conducts such as filing for injunctive relief 
by SEP holders will be also reviewed.
With regard to the specific types of conduct related to standard setting, 
first, non-disclosure of relevant patent information is defined as 
‘unreasonably not disclosing information on the relevant patent or patent 
application in order to increase the possibility for its technology to be 
selected as the technology standard or avoid prior negotiations for license 
conditions’.  This is related to the procedure under which the SSO requires 
or encourages its members to disclose relevant patent information prior to 
the selection of the technology standard. Second, discrimination in license 
conditions or imposition of unreasonable license fee is defined as 
‘unreasonably discriminatory license terms of SEP or imposing an 
unreasonable level of license fee’. This is related to the negotiation 
procedure for license conditions under which the patent owner commits to 
the SSO, prior to the selection of the patented technology for inclusion in 
the standard that it will negotiate on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) terms for licensing of patented technology. Third, the following 
types of conduct are established as categories of IPR abuse by SEP holder 
by the amended IPR Guidelines: (i) refusal to license SEP; (ii) discrimination 
in license terms of SEP; (iii) imposition of conditions restricting the exercise 
of patent rights or conditions of cross-licensing of non-standard essential 
patents; and (iv) the filing for injunctive relief by SEP holder that has 
committed to grant a license on FRAND terms, against a willing licensee.    
With regard to the illegality standard, the IPR Guidelines Chapter III, 
Article 5, Paragraph A lists the types of specific conduct from Section (1) to 
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(6) and includes the word ‘unreasonable’, which is an indication of 
illegality, in each type of conduct. Also, with respect to the standard for 
unreasonableness, it emphasizes whether disclosure of relevant patent 
information and the negotiation procedure for license conditions are 
performed should be important factors to be considered in order to judge 
illegality, and proposes these as the conduct-specific standards.  Moreover, 
it suggests, as a general illegality standard, factors to be considered in 
determining illegality of abuse of market dominance, unreasonable 
concerted acts, unfair business practices or prohibited conduct of 
enterprises’ association should be also considered. In this regard, in the IPR 
Guidelines Chapter II, Article 3, ‘Factors to be considered to Find Illegality’, 
these standards for illegality are collectively called ‘anti-competitive effects’ 
and the details of such effects are provided similarly to those provided in 
the KFTC’s Guidelines for Review of Abuse of Market Dominant Position 
(Abuse Guidelines).  
The IPR Guidelines provides that such acts as non-disclosure of patent 
information, discrimination in license conditions or imposition of 
unreasonable license fee can be viewed as likely to be beyond the legitimate 
scope of patent rights. However, it is very difficult to determine whether 
such acts constitute conduct prohibited under the MRFTA or whether there 
exist such acts ever.4) Therefore, it is necessary to review whether such 
conduct meets the requirements of corresponding conduct under the 
MRFTA, i.e. abuse of market dominance under the MRFTA, as provided in 
the IPR Guidelines. 
2. Relevant anti-competitive conduct under the MRTFA 
1) Non-disclosure of relevant patent information 
It is not clear which type of conduct listed in ‘abuse of market dominant 
position’ under the MRFTA non-disclosure of relevant patent information 
would fall within. The MRFTA distinguishes the party which is engaged in 
the conduct, the counterparty of the conduct, and a third party which will 
4) It is particularly the case when determining whether fees to which licensors and 
licensees agree in arms-length negotiations is unreasonable.
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be affected by such conduct5) and identifies an illegal conduct based on 
‘interests’ that are infringed or could be infringed by the conduct. However, 
in addressing an act of non-disclosure, the IPR Guidelines is not clearly 
identifying the counterparty or the party affected by the conduct. It is also 
not clear what types of interests could be infringed by such conduct. 
Apart from the issue of whether the patent owner holds dominant 
position,6) non-disclosure of relevant patent information may be examined 
to determine whether it constitutes an act of unreasonably interfering with 
the business activities of another business entity by a market dominant 
player under Article 3-2, Paragraph 1 Section 3 of the MRFTA, a catch-all 
provision on abuse of market dominance. However, it should be further 
reviewed whether an act of non-disclosure of relevant patent information 
would satisfy all the requirements of such provision under the MRFTA, 
and if not, which additional acts or elements must be present in order to 
meet the requirements.
Unreasonably interfering with another enterprise’s business activities 
by a market dominant player under the MRFTA is further developed in the 
Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA and the Abuse Guidelines. The 
Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA (Article 5 Paragraph 3) identifies 
interfering activities relating to essential elements for another enterprise’s 
business activities such as raw materials, workforce and other elements 
essential to manufacture, supply and sale of products or services (Article 5 
Paragraph 3 Section No 1, 2 and 3). In addition, it also includes a general 
catch-all provision (Article 5 Paragraph 3 Section No. 4), stating that ‘other 
activities to unreasonably interfere with the business activities of others as 
further determined by the KFTC’s relevant notice’ may be also regarded as 
5) Hong Dae-Sik, Sabeobjeog Gwanjeomeseo Bon Gongjeonggeolaebeob - Sijangjibaejeogjiwi 
Namyonghaengwileul Jungsimeulo- [Korean Competition Law from a Private Law Perspective: 
Focused on Abuse of Market-dominant Position], 27(2) sanGsabeobyeonGU [commercial law 
review] 351 (2008).  
6) This part of the IPR Guidelines simply deals with the issue of specific types of conducts 
determined separately from the issue of dominant position. Since whether the patent owner 
holds dominant position should be also determined in accordance with the general standard 
provided in the Abuse Guidelines regardless of whether the conduct of patent owner 
apparently falls within the scope of specific conduct type, the allegation that the patent owner 
improperly failed to disclose the patent prior to standardization should not be the basis for 
concluding that the patent owner is dominant at the time of non-disclosure. 
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violations of the MRFTA.  The Abuse Guidelines, accordingly, identifies 
additional types of conduct constituting unreasonable interference with 
business activities of other enterprises, including: refusal to deal, imposing 
unreasonable terms outside the scope of normal business practice, 
discrimination in the price or trade terms, imposing terms or conditions 
disadvantageous to the counterparty, etc (Chapter IV, Article 3, Paragraph 
D).
2) Unfair discrimination in license terms or imposition of unreasonable royalty
Unfair discrimination in license terms of SEP or imposition of 
unreasonable royalty may fall within ‘an act to unfairly discriminate in 
price or trade terms’ under the Abuse Guidelines (Article IV, Article 3, 
Paragraph D, Section (2)), a type of interfering with business activities of 
other enterprises by a market dominant player under the MRFTA (Article 
3-2, Paragraph 1 Section 3).
In order to determine whether the conduct in question constitutes an act 
of discrimination in price or trade terms under the MRFTA, a separate 
analysis is required to determine the ‘discriminatory’ conduct element.7) 
However, ‘discrimination in license terms’ is merely a reformulation of 
price or trade term discrimination at the patent licensing stage and plays no 
role in specifying detailed types of unfair discrimination under the MRFTA 
taking place with regard to exercise of patent rights relevant to technology 
standards.
The IPR Guidelines seems to intend to directly regulate the degree of 
royalty, which is of exploitative nature, while the interference with business 
activities is of exclusionary nature.  In this regard, the applicable MRFTA 
provision would be the provision on pricing as abuse of market dominance, 
which prohibits unreasonably determining, maintaining or changing the 
price of the commodities or services (Article 3-2 Paragraph 1 Section 1). 
While the MRFTA provision seems to cover all the stages of determination, 
maintenance and change of price, Article 5 Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement 
7) The KFTC’s Abuse Guidelines does not include any standards by which to judge the 
behavioral element of discrimination, but the KFTC referred to the standards specified in the 
Guidelines on Review of Unfair Business Practices in reaching a decision in the Qualcomm 
case. See KFTC Decision, 2009-281, Dec. 30, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
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Decree, as delegated by the MRFTA, limits the scope of the conduct stating 
that the conduct prohibited under Article 3-2 Paragraph 1 Section 1 of the 
MRFTA means substantial price increase or slight decrease of the price 
without any justifiable reason. This has raised questions as to whether the 
legislature’s intent was to limit the scope of pricing as an abuse of market 
dominance to a ‘change’ of the price only8) and thus whether the IPR 
Guidelines should not regulate the price determination itself.  
3) Categories of IPR abuse by an SEP holder
The amended IPR Guidelines newly added three types of conduct 
related to standard setting―avoidance or circumvention of licensing on 
FRAND terms, imposition of conditions restricting the exercise of patent 
rights or conditions of cross-licensing of non-standard essential patents, 
and the filing for injunctive relief by SEP holder. Among these three types, 
the latter two types are specific to SEP holders. Furthermore, the Guidelines 
reclassified two already existing types of conduct related to standard-
setting―refusal to license SEP and discrimination of license terms of SEP―
which were previously applied to patents widely used as technology 
standards. As a result, types of conduct related to standard setting can be 
divided into two subcategories as follows:
(a) Conduct types specific to standard-related patent holders in general
   (i)    Unreasonably agreeing to conditions limiting the price, volume, 
regions, counterparts and technology improvement of the trade
   (ii)   Unreasonably not disclosing information on the relevant patent or 
patent application in order to increase the possibility for its 
technology to be selected as the technology standard or avoid 
prior negotiations for license conditions
   (iii)  Unreasonably evading or the circumventing the grant of a license 
of FRAND terms to strengthen dominance in the relevant market 
or to exclude its competitors
   (iv)  imposing an unreasonable level of license fee
8) Lee Bong Eui, Doggwajeom Sijanggwa Chagchwinamyongui Gyuje 
[Conduct of Exploitative Abuse in Korea], 22 GyeonGjaenGbeobyeonGu 
[journal of Korean Competition law] 138-140 (2010).
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(b) Conduct types specific to SEP holders
   (i)   Unreasonably refusing to license SEP
   (ii)  Unreasonably discriminatory license terms of SEP
   (iii)  Granting a license on SEP while imposing unreasonable terms to 
restrict the licensee from exercising any relevant patent held by 
the licensee or unreasonably requiring the licensee to cross-license 
non-SEPs held by the licensee
   (iv)  Filing for injunctive relief by a SEP holder that has committed to 
grant a license on FRAND terms, against a willing licensee
The amended IPR Guidelines defines SEPs as ‘patents used to 
implement standard technologies9) that must be licensed to manufacture 
products or provide services in need of the standard technologies’. The 
amended IPR Guidelines acknowledges that an SEP holder may seek 
injunctive relief against patent infringement. Under the amended IP 
Guidelines, however, such conduct may constitute IPR abuse if the SEP 
holder is committed to licensing its SEP on FRAND terms and the entity 
against which the injunctive relief is sought is willing to enter into a license 
agreement on FRAND terms. In this context, the amended IPR Guidelines 
also specifies that, if the SEP holder does not negotiate the granting of a 
license in good faith with a willing licensee and files for injunctive relief, 
there is a greater likelihood that this will be determined as conduct that is 
likely to restrict competition in the relevant market as it exceeds the 
legitimate scope of exercise of patent right. It means that for the SEP holder, 
two factors both from licensor side (whether a licensor is negotiating in 
good faith) and licensee side (whether a potential licensee is willing to 
9) Standard technologies are defined as ‘technologies designated by government, 
standard setting organizations, enterprises’ associations, a group of enterprises possessing 
technology of the same type, etc. as standard in specific technology areas, or technologies 
actually used widely as the standard in the relevant technology area’. See IPR Guidelines in 
Section I.3.A(5). For critics of this inclusion of de facto standards to the definition, see American 
Bar Association, Joint Comments of the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law, 
Intellectual Property Law, International Law, and Science & Technology Law on Revisions to the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission’s Review Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights 
(October 30, 2015) 3-4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrust_law/
resources.html.  
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license on FRAND terms) should be considered as decisive or more 
important. This can be regarded as an attempt to shift from the totality of 
circumstances test or the unstructured rule of reason approach to the 
structured rule of reason approach10) by enabling an evaluation through a 
series of screens composed of weighted factors. In addition, under the 
amended IPR Guidelines, whether the SEP holder conducted negotiations 
in good faith with a willing licensee is determined on the basis of a totality 
of circumstances test including such factors as (i) whether the SEP holder 
formally requested negotiations, (ii) whether the duration of the 
negotiations was adequate, (iii) whether the licensing terms offered by the 
SEP holder were reasonable and non-discriminatory, and (iv) whether the 
SEP holder sought means of resolving any contentious issue that arose 
during negotiations. Furthermore, illustrative circumstances where the 
filing for injunctive relief will likely not be considered as an abusive act are 
also stipulated.  
The provisions relating to the filing for injunctive relief by a SEP holder 
in the amended IPR Guidelines seems be influenced by the experience of 
the Samsung Electronics case. In this case, Apple filed a complaint against 
Samsung to the KFTC on April 3, 2012 alleging that Samsung abused its 
market dominant position by seeking injunction based on SEPs during 
ongoing negotiations between two parties. A FRAND commitment is a 
contract between a SEP holder and an SSO to license the SEP on FRAND 
terms to potential licensees to implement a standard. A potential licensee 
could be a third-party beneficiary of this contract. A FRAND-encumbered 
SEP holder is under a pre-contractual obligation to negotiate the license in 
good faith, not under a contractual duty to grant a FRAND license to any 
potential licensee. SSO rules generally do not preclude injunctions 
especially where the potential licensee is not willing to negotiate in good 
faith on FRAND terms. Against this background and the difference in fact-
finding about the negotiations Samsung and Apple conducted in Korea 
over Samsung’s patents compared with in other countries, two factors that 
Apple was an unwilling licensee and that Samsung was in good faith 
10) For the methodology of implementing a structured rule of reason approach in tying 
law area, refer to Christian Ahlborn & David S Evans & Jorge Padilla, The antitrust economics of 
tying: a farewell to per se illegality, antitrUst bUlletin 330-336 (Spring 2004).
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during the negotiations were considered as significant in determining 
whether there was a breach of the FRAND commitment. On February 25, 
2014, the KFTC rejected Apple’s complaint. 
3.  Methods and related problems regarding the assessment of illegality 
and establishment of judgment standard
The IPR Guidelines’ approach implies that if the conduct in question 
falls within the scope of the conduct types identified in the IPR Guidelines, 
anti-competitive effects are presumed unless there are special circumstances. 
In particular, the IPR Guidelines implies that misuse of the standard-setting 
process or imposition of unfair licensing terms after standardization is 
illustrative conduct with anti-competitive effects. This may induce the 
public to perceive that such conduct are typical examples of illegality, as 
non-disclosure of relevant patent information is related to the standard-
setting process and discrimination in licensing terms or imposition of 
unreasonable royalty is related to the licensing process of the technology 
included in the standard after standardization.
The problematic part in the IPR Guidelines with respect to the judgment 
standard of illegality is that, the Guidelines stipulate ‘whether a patent 
holder has undergone patent information disclosure procedure and 
consultation procedure on licensing terms’ is an important factor to be 
considered in finding illegality. In particular, in presenting the illegality 
standard, the IPR Guidelines do not take the usual stance of listing the 
considerations related to determination and then making a comprehensive 
determination test based on such considerations, but rather emphasize 
certain factors as being important. This is difficult to be recognized as valid 
as the KFTC has little experience in regulating such type of conduct.  
III.  Procedures for Setting Technology Standards and 
Exercise of Standard-related Patents 
1. Technology Standard-Settings by SSOs
The necessity of technology standards is emphasized from the industrial 
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policy perspective as technology standards create efficiency by enhancing 
compatibility between technologies and facilitate the use and development 
of the related technologies. In particular, in the case of network businesses 
such as computer networking and telecommunications, the establishment 
of interoperability standards or compatibility standards is almost 
inevitable, in order to connect more users to the network or develop more 
complementary goods to obtain direct or indirect network effects and 
create profit in such network industries. Especially in the case of network 
businesses, the value of a product for particular consumers depends upon 
how many of these different consumers use identical or compatible 
products.11) In this perspective, technology standards which enable 
interoperability or compatibility and thereby improve product utility also 
bring important benefits to consumers.
Standardization or the setting of a standard can sometimes in fact take 
place in the market as a result of widespread acceptance in the market 
dramatically above and beyond alternatives (de facto standards). However, 
particularly in industries for which interoperability is important, there are 
an increasing number of cases where collective standardization takes place 
through SSOs. This is best shown in telecommunication markets where the 
level of technology applied to the provided service is changing at a fast rate 
and advancing to a higher level.
In general, standard-setting through SSO involves (i) the evaluation by 
subject matter experts of the relative merits of various proposals or 
solutions to identified problems or tasks, and (ii) further debate over and 
ultimately the selection of a particular standard proposal through a vote of 
the interested parties holding voting membership. Individual members or 
groups thereof may as a practical matter consider not only the technical 
merits of different alternatives that have been proposed, but also any 
ownership or other interest they may have in a proposed technology. 
Collective technology standard-setting through SSO has the effect of 
promoting competition and technological innovation. However, such 
standardization may also in itself give rise to the risk of excluding 
competition from the technology market, pushing back technological 
11) Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 cal. 
l. rev. 1889 (2002).
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innovation, reducing the right to customers to make a selection or 
promoting collusive acts, depending on the characteristics of the SSO and 
the contents of the technology established as a standard.12) These 
considerations are thought to warrant some scrutiny of the standard-setting 
process and decisions. 
2.  Interests of Patent Holders in Strategic Acts during Technology 
Standard-setting Process
Assuming a situation where alternative technologies existed at the time 
of selection of a technology standard through an SSO and insufficient 
information was available to make reasonable choices among such 
alternatives, the holder of the patented technology might act strategically in 
order to make its own patented technology be selected over a close 
alternative technology to be included in the technology standard.13) 
Assuming such circumstances, major issues would be, which standard to 
apply for the assessment of certain acts by holders of patented technology 
during and after standardization as an abuse of the standardization process 
or an act infringing the interests of a competitor or business counterparty 
through unreasonable use of its patented technology included in the 
established standard, as well as determination of which stage and method 
to allow the MRFTA intervention in order to either block or respond to 
such an abusive or infringing act.
An SSO may operate the established standard through an open or 
closed method.14) While operating through the open method means that the 
SSO will have certain regulation limiting the ability of owners of patent 
technology so as to open up the availability of the standard, operation 
through the closed method means that the availability of the standard will 
be limited due to the unrestricted patent rights of owners. In the event that 
12) OECD, Standard-Setting and Competition Policy 5-7, DAF/COMP/WP2(2010)4 
(2010). 
13) Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (University of 
Chicago Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=902646.  
14) See Lemley, supra note 11.
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the standard established through SSO is operated openly, the SSO will try 
to promote the availability of the standard, to actual or potential 
competitors who wish to use the standardized technology as a component 
of a good and commercialize the good in combination with other 
complementary production factors, in order to minimize the possibility of 
leveraging any power over technology conferred by standardization into 
the market related to the distribution of goods using the particular 
technology. An SSO could try to exclude all patented technology from its 
standards, but that might compromise the quality, performance, and/or 
attractiveness of the standard. Another method which may be used15) 
would be to have the SSO seek and obtain assurances that patented 
technology under consideration will be made available to parties that may 
be interested in providing standard-compliant products and services before 
the establishment of a standard.
This may be a difficult undertaking in the event that the SSO does not 
have sufficient information. In such case, some critics16) point out the risk 
that the patent holder or applicant of a technology which may be 
established as a standard may use the asymmetric balance of information to 
carry out deceptive publicity or to hide relevant information during the 
process of standardization with respect to the suitability of the relevant 
technology as standard or the scope of the exercise of patent rights. 
As the US Supreme Court ruled in Illinois Tools Works,17) owning a patent 
does not necessarily mean that the holder has market dominating power. 
This means that inclusion of the patent holder’s patented technology in a 
standard does not mean that the holder has obtained market dominating 
power. However, in events where the patent holder’s patented technology 
15) For a review on what is being suggested as ex ante approaches by distinguishing from 
IPR policy, refer to Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting lead to Exploitative 
Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 
eUropean competition law JoUrnal 101 (2007).
16) For domestic discussion of the MRFTA issue on standardization, refer to Son Young 
Hoa, Neteuwokeu Sijangeseoui Gisulpyojungwa Gongjeonggeolaebeobsangui Munje [A Study on 
Standardization in the Network Market and Antitrust Law], 22 (1) sanGsabeobyeonGU [commercial 
law review] (2003); Oh Seung Han, Teugheogisului Pyojun Chaegjeonggwa Gyeongjaengbeob 
Jeogyongui Munje [Standard-setting Incorporating Patented Technologies and Its Anticompetitive 
Effect, 23 saneobJaesanGwon [indUstrial property riGhts] (2007).
17) Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink. Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
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is included in a standard over a close alternative technology, and the 
standard is not in competition with another technology standard, 
standardization may confer an increment of market dominating power that 
the patent owner might not have had absent standardization.  However, 
even in such cases, the MRFTA is not questioning the acquisition of market 
dominating power itself but is questioning the unreasonable exercise of 
power by such market dominant enterprise. In this context, if there exists 
no causal relationship, such as establishment that the patent holder’s 
technology would not have been included in the standard but for an unjust 
act such as intentionally failing to disclose one or more of its patents that 
are technically essential to a proposed standard for the purpose of inducing 
the SSO to adopt the standard without excluding the patent, the patent 
holder’s exercise of rights authorized by patent laws to the patented 
technology based on rightful power cannot be questioned through 
competition law.
One thing to note here is that when the source of market dominating 
power of the patent holder is the patent itself, then the patent holder has 
acquired its patent legitimately through the operation of the patent law, 
and competition law intervention is unwarranted. But if the source of the 
patent holder’s market power is standardization, and not merely the rights 
granted by patent law, and the patent owner engages in improper conduct 
as described in the preceding paragraph, then the particular act 
strategically carried out by the patent holder ex post can be assessed as an 
opportunistic conduct. However, even then, in order to place such 
particular conduct assessed to be opportunistic as a point of interest in the 
MRFTA, the following aspects must be reviewed: effects that the 
standardization has on the technology market including the standardized 
technology and substitutable technology; whether licensing of the 
technology included in the standard is necessary for using the standard; 
and effects that the use of the established standard have on the product 
market related to the distribution of the goods using the relevant 
technology. In other words, just because a conduct can be assessed as 
opportunistic from the perspective of standardization process, which is a 
private ordering process for standardization with industrial purposes, does 
not mean that it will always draw attention from the MRFTA. Rather, 
because this is an issue subject to changes in the related standard, 
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characteristics of technology included therein and market situation, 
whether such conduct is opportunistic and whether it may raise an issue 
under competition law are two very distinct questions.
3. Countermeasures by SSOs to Prevent Opportunistic Conduct
SSOs have certain regulations limiting the ability of owners of patented 
technology included in standards to behave opportunistically once the 
standard has been adopted and sunk costs by standards implementers 
preclude switching to a new or different standard. In addition, SSOs 
usually request members to give their consent to these regulations as a 
condition to their joining of the SSO or include such regulations as part of 
the standardization agreement, which is called the ‘Patent Policy’ or 
‘Intellectual Property Policy’ of the SSOs.18)
Such measures include firstly, imposition on members participating in 
the standardization process, of a duty to disclose information in good faith 
on their patented technology or technology for which patent application 
process is pending, and secondly, request for a commitment to license 
patents included in the standard according to ‘Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory (RAND)’ or ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory 
(FRAND)’ terms after the establishment of technology as a standard.19)  
For the former measure where the disclosure obligation is imposed 
against patent holders who are SSO members, such measure may be 
considered mandatory in that sanctions can be imposed at the request of 
the SSO or its members for violative conduct. Meanwhile, the latter 
measure cannot be regarded to have an obligatory characteristic as its 
binding power depends on the willingness of the patent owner to commit 
to licensing the patents on FRAND terms.  SSOs usually do not require 
their members to make FRAND commitments, but they request or 
encourage them to do so, and may reject or alter a proposed standard if the 
owner of an essential patent refuses to make a FRAND commitment. The 
commitment is usually given for the benefit of producers of standard-
compliant products and enforceable through breach of contract remedies 
18) See Lemley, supra note 11.
19) Id.
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by them. Moreover, if one was to judge at the time of the SSO’s 
standardization, in the event that a causal connection can be established 
that the SSO would not have included the technology of the patent holder if 
the latter had disclosed its patent information, the conduct in violation of 
the disclosure requirement of patent information may have the ex ante 
opportunistic characteristic in order to get the technology established as 
standard. However, it is more reasonable to regard the imposition of duty 
to disclose patent information, as in the case of the imposition of licensing 
commitment to FRAND terms, as a countermeasure to seek contractual 
means for preventing or restricting ex post opportunistic conduct that may 
take place during the stage of licensing which takes place after the SSO has 
established the standard upon gathering sufficient relevant patent 
information.
1) Imposition of Duty in Good Faith to Disclose Patent Information
Imposition of duty to disclose patent information is intended to prevent 
in advance problems due to the information failure caused by the 
asymmetric balance of information between the SSO, who only has the 
limited group average information of the members and the patent holder, 
who has more information. However, it is important to understand the 
significant limits on the knowledge and abilities of patent holders. When a 
patent is said to be included in or essential to a standard, this does not 
mean that the patent is specifically referenced in the standard.  Instead, it 
means that the standard cannot be implemented without infringing the 
patent. One needs only to consider the uncertainty of predicting outcomes 
in patent infringement litigation to understand that determining when a 
single patent is infringed can be a difficult undertaking.  That difficulty is 
magnified when an enterprise owns thousands of patents, and a proposed 
standard is constantly undergoing revision.20) In recognition of that 
difficulty, SSO patent disclosure policies use a ‘good faith’ standard, and 
20) In particular, the greater the patent portfolio, the more likely it is non-disclosure in 
good faith. It can be difficult to thoroughly review a large portfolio: matching claims to 
standard specs can be subjective; engineers attending the SSO meeting may be unaware of the 
company’s full patent portfolio; the standard evolves over time so it is a moving target, etc. 
See Anne Layne-Farrar, How to Avoid Antitrust Trouble in Standard Setting: A Practical Approach, 
23(3) antitrUst (2009).
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often make clear that their members are not required thereby to conduct 
patent searches. These same considerations underlie the holdings of some 
courts that failure to disclose a patent does not warrant intervention under 
competition law unless the patent owner knew it had a patent that it should 
have disclosed, but deliberately failed to do so to cause the SSO to adopt 
the standard without excluding the patent.
Although not always true, nor presumed to be true, a situation where 
patent information is not sufficiently disclosed by patent holder may hinder 
the efforts of the SSO to take measures to ensure the availability of 
technology essential to the standard, and thus the availability and success 
of the standard. For example, the SSO may not be able to demand 
contractual means to prepare for problems which may arise during the 
licensing stage after the standardization process, such as requiring 
commitments to FRAND terms that correspond to the scope of rights to the 
relevant patented technology, based on the information gathered by the 
SSO alone.  Because this would bring the potential risk of the patent holder 
carrying out opportunistic conduct, SSOs require patent holders to disclose 
patent information, in order to prevent or restrict such conduct and 
guarantee procedural fairness in the standard-setting process, without 
imposing undue burden such as conducting a patent search.
However, just because the patent holder does not disclose patent 
information does not mean that this can be always linked to a potential risk 
that the patent holder will carry out ex post opportunistic conduct. 
Imposing disclosure of patent information is a preemptive measure to 
counter issues that may be caused by information failure resulting from the 
asymmetric balance of information. Thus, there is no issue in cases in which 
the standard-setting is conducted in a situation where patent information is 
easily accessible through open sources regardless of whether there is 
disclosure of patent information and the standard-setting was based on the 
information gathered by SSO through such sources. Further, as noted 
above, there may be a case where the patent holder did not know that the 
patent holder’s technology was included in the standard (i.e., the standard 
could not be implemented without infringing the patent).   
Therefore, non-disclosure can only be problematic and subject to 
intervention by the government in the event that the patent holder was 
aware that disclosure of relevant patent information was being required 
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with regard to technology which could be included in a technology 
standard, during the standardization process, but the patent holder or 
applicant actively deceived the SSO that the patent holder’s technology was 
not subject to patent, or where the patent holder or applicant hid the fact 
that the relevant technology was subject to patent in a situation where the 
SSO was under the misconception that the relevant technology was not. 
Such principle corresponds to subjective events such as fraud, coercion, and 
other unfair conduct.
Even intentional and deceptive non-disclosure might not be enough to 
warrant intervention under competition law as opposed to contract law. 
Intervention under competition law would not be justified unless, (i) but for 
the non-disclosure, the SSO would have rejected or altered the standard to 
exclude the patent owner’s technology, or would have obtained a FRAND 
commitment from the patent owner, and (ii) the patent owner acquired 
market power that it would not have had absent standardization. 
Therefore, in order to bring such conduct as an issue within the MRFTA, it 
is necessary to distinguish the elements of specific conduct and include 
them in the conduct requirement in order to examine whether the patent 
holder’s conduct can be viewed as conduct intended to induce the inclusion 
of the patent owner’s technology into the standard, which would allow the 
patent holder to obtain market dominance, and also whether such conduct 
actually caused the inclusion of patent holder’s technology into the 
standard and allowed the patent holder to obtain market dominance.
2) Request for Commitment to License according to FRAND Terms 
SSO’s requests for commitments to negotiate licenses according to 
FRAND terms from patent holders whose technology is included in the 
standard, can be perceived as a policy measure from the perspective of the 
SSO as a means to make sure that businesses other than patent holders can 
effectively compete in the downstream market by using the patented 
technology, without undue diminution in the rights of patent holders. 
However, it is impossible to uniformly determine the motive or purpose for 
preparing such policy measures, as each SSO may have different motive or 
purpose.21) The agreement to abide by such a commitment may be a 
21) See Lemley, supra note 11.
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condition for the patent holder’s technology to be included in the standard, 
particularly if reasonably close alternatives to that technology exist. 
Some have argued that a patent owner who has failed to comply ex post 
with its ex ante commitment to negotiate a license on FRAND terms is 
engaging in a form of patent hold-up which is ex post opportunistic 
conduct, and should be regulated through the application of competition 
law.22) Such a hypothetical argument cannot be allowed as a ground of the 
further review of whether competition law has been violated, unless the 
argument can be supported by empirical evidence. However, it is difficult 
to find empirical evidence to prove that such ex post opportunism 
frequently occurs.23) Furthermore, even if a patent holder has given 
commitment to license under FRAND terms in the standardization process, 
this is a private contract executed with the SSO. To this end, it is not 
reasonable to assess that an issue exists under competition law simply 
because the licensing terms imposed by the patent holder against producers 
using the technology violated FRAND terms, without the unique 
examination under competition law on whether those imposed licensing 
terms could be linked to the effect of restricting or harming competition. 
A Commitment to license under FRAND terms is carried out by the 
holder of the patented technology to be included in the standard committed 
to license to third parties under RAND or FRAND terms. RAND terms 
refer to reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and are usually used in 
SSOs based in the United States, while FRAND terms adding “fair” to 
RAND are widely used in SSOs based in the EU.24) However, there is no 
indication that FRAND and RAND are intended to mean different things.
Fair and reasonable terms generally mean that the license terms shall be 
non-exploitative, but such meaning is not specifically defined in the IPR 
policy of SSOs. These terms are determined through fair, bilateral 
negotiation between the patent holder and the standard user in accordance 
22) Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents and Hold-up, 74 antitrUst law JoUrnal 
603 (2007).
23) For articles that appropriately criticize theoretical arguments about ‘hold up’, see 
Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, FRAND Commitment and EC Competition Law (2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527407. 
24) Id.
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with the market conditions prevailing at the time of such negotiations.25) 
Meanwhile, non-discriminatory terms refer to terms under which the 
patent holder and standard user may both access the standard technology 
according to the same conditions in similar circumstances and allow for 
both parties to fairly compete against each other under the same 
conditions.26)
Even assuming that FRAND commitments have been made, it is 
difficult to determine whether there has been a violation of such 
commitment, due to difficulty of determining outside of negotiations in the 
market when prices and other terms are excessive or unfair. While it may 
be relatively easier to determine whether certain license terms are non-
discriminatory, based on objective standards, it is often if not always 
difficult to determine whether the terms are fair and reasonable, as 
appropriate benchmarks for comparison may not be available. In practice, 
potential standard users may be usually more interested in non-
discriminatory terms than the fairness and reasonableness of the license 
terms, as discriminatory terms may have more substantial impact on the 
capacity of the users to compete with one another.27)
IV.  Review of Specific Conduct Types in the Exercise of 
Standard-related Patents 
1. Overview
The question of how to specify illegal conduct, then, becomes how to 
distinguish and categorize an act as illegal from the perspective of the 
MRFTA’s objectives. In this regard, the author is of the position that (i) 
illegality should be prescribed in relation to competition, and (ii) the 
elements of illegal conduct should comprise factors that could show certain 
levels of illegality (that is prescribed in relation to competition), and thus 
require a determination of illegality under competition laws.
25) Id.
26) Id.
27) Id. However, the trend may be changing.
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In the following section, this paper reviews factors comprising the 
elements of problematic exercises of patent rights related to a technology 
standard (that are listed under the IPR Guidelines) in relation to illegality 
under the MRFTA, with the understanding that the enumeration of such 
problematic exercise of patent rights under the IPR Guidelines is an effort 
to specify the elements of conduct listed under the provisions of abuse of 
market dominance under the MRFTA. Based on this review, issues in the 
proposed conduct types under the IPR Guidelines are identified and 
alternative solutions are offered.
2. Non-Disclosure of Relevant Patent Information
1)  Interpretation Standard and Scope of the Conduct of Impeding Another’s 
Business
It is interesting to note that there are numerous cases where the KFTC 
applied Article 5 Paragraph 3 Section No. 4 of the Enforcement Decree and 
the Abuse Guidelines, while there are a few cases where the KFTC applied 
Article 5, Paragraph 3, Section No 1, 2 or 3 of the Enforcement Decree. In 
case a conduct falls under the prescribed conduct under the Enforcement 
Decree or the Abuse Guidelines, the KFTC presumes such conduct to meet 
the ‘interference’ requirement under the MRFTA. Furthermore, in certain 
cases where a conduct does not exactly fall within the purview of any of 
specific conduct prescribed in the Enforcement Decree and the Abuse 
Guidelines, the KFTC has directly applied the catch-all provision of the 
MRFTA (Article 3-2, Paragraph 1 Section 3).28) Taking this approach, the 
KFTC may make a risky decision to presume an act of exercise of patent 
rights in relation to the technology standards, if it apparently falls under the 
category prescribed in the IPR Guidelines, to fulfill the conduct requirement 
of the provision of interference with business activities under the MRFTA, 
without analyzing whether the conduct in fact constitutes interference with 
business activities of other enterprises under the MRFTA.29)
28) KFTC Decision, 2007-81, May 18, 2007 (hereinafter KFTC Hyundai Motor Case)
29) Hong Dae Sik, Sijangjibaejeog Jiwi Namyonghaengwiui Pandan Gijun Gaeseonbangan 
[Improvement Scheme of Standard for Determining Abuse of Market-dominant Position], 21 
GyeonGJaenGbeobyeonGU [JoUrnal of Korean competition law] 131-132 (2010). However, given 
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Even though the provision of the MRFTA that the IPR Guidelines 
applies to the conduct of non-disclosure of relevant patent information is 
the provision on ‘impeding another’s business activities’, the conduct as 
defined in the IPR Guidelines does not satisfy the elements of impeding 
another’s business activities. This can be confirmed by studying the 
elements constituting an act of impeding another’s business activities as an 
abuse of market dominance, and thereby clarifying its standard of 
construction and definitional scope.
In considering the requirements specified in Paragraph 1, Article 32 of 
the MRFTA and the main context of Paragraph 3, Article 5 of the 
Enforcement Decree on abuse of market dominance, the standard for 
interpreting an act of impeding another’s business activities can be set forth 
as follows:
First, an act of impeding another’s business activities must involve the 
business activities of ‘another’. The term ‘another’ covers not only 
transacting parties but also competitors.30) In most cases, another’s business 
activities mean the business activities of a counterparty (i.e. transacting 
party such as seller or buyer, recipient of unilateral conduct such as refusal 
to deal).  It could, however, also mean a third party including competitor 
whose business activities are affected by an act of impediment but 
indirectly as opposed to the counterparty to which the act is directed. In the 
latter case, it is asserted that a better defined standard and a higher burden 
of proof on the effects of an act of impediment should be required as the 
effects of an act on the third party are not as evident as those on the 
counterparty.
Second, there must be an act of ‘impeding’ another’s business activities. 
To determine whether an act of impediment occurred, separate standards 
apply depending on whether the party being affected is the same as the 
party to whom the act is directed. If the counterparty of an act is the same 
that this abstract catch-all provision lacks predictability as to which conduct is prohibited and 
that the specific prohibited conduct should be clearly identified in the Enforcement Decree 
and the Abuse Guidelines to the extent authorized by the catch-all provision, it would not be 
appropriate to directly apply a catch-all provision to conduct which does not even fall into 
any of the specific types of conducts provided in the Abuse Guidelines. This also relates to the 
issue of judgment criteria for interpretation standard and scope of pricing. 
30) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Du7465, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
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as the party that is affected, whether an act of impediment occurred can 
easily be established by examining the act itself. On the other hand, if the 
counterparty of an act is different from the party that is affected, i.e., an act 
of impediment was directed toward one party but its effects were felt by 
another, the impeding act must have a direct link to an aspect of another’s 
business activities such that causality must exist between an act impeding 
certain aspect of another’s business and that party’s business activities 
being impeded.
Third, an act of impeding another’s business activities must be of such 
‘degree’ that can cause hardship for the business activities of another, 
which hardship in turn must be measurable by determining whether the 
affected party’s business activities suffered specific disadvantage.  Here, the 
element of impediment, which refers to the effects of one’s act on another, 
can be distinguished from anti-competitiveness, which means the effects of 
one’s act on the market.
‘Impeding’ another’s business activities is defined in Paragraph 3, 
Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree as causing hardship on the business 
activities of another. Section V. 3 of the Abuse Guidelines provides that, in 
determining whether another’s business activities are ‘impeded’, the 
affected party’s activities of production, finance and sales must be 
considered overall and ‘impeding’ includes the risk of hardship that may 
be caused on another’s business activities.  
There is a line of Supreme Court cases that, applying the provision on 
impeding another’s business activities as an abuse of market dominance, 
suggests which factors to consider in establishing an act of impediment. For 
example, in the Posco case,31) the Supreme Court distinguished ‘a business 
suffering disadvantage such as facing hardship or the risk of hardship’ 
from ‘unreasonableness’. Whereas unreasonableness refers to certain effects 
that conduct has on the market, ‘a business suffering disadvantage’ is a 
factor in determining whether an act having certain effects on another party 
constitutes impediment. In other words, impediment as a requisite conduct 
element can be established when an affected party suffers specific 
disadvantage relating to its business activities or when there is a risk of 
31) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du8626 (en banc), Nov. 22, 2007 (S. Kor.).
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such disadvantage.
In defining specific disadvantage, against which the law provides 
protection, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of causing disadvantage as a 
specific type of abuse of a superior bargaining position constituting an 
unfair trade practice, which requires ‘disadvantage’ as a conduct element, 
can serve as a reference. In determining ‘disadvantage’, one of the requisite 
conduct elements constituting an act of causing disadvantage, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that the specific ‘disadvantage’ suffered by a counterparty 
must be clearly confirmed in an objective manner and, if the ‘disadvantage’ 
suffered is one of monetary damage, the legal liability thereof as well as its 
extent should be clearly established.32) The court’s decision reflects the legal 
principles under the Korean Civil Code (KCC) that defines an act of 
impeding, a requisite conduct element, in connection with specific 
disadvantage. The concept of impediment under the KCC is one of the 
factors in establishing the claim for eliminating an impediment against 
ownership (under Article 214 of the KCC) as an ex ante preventative 
measure, in contrast to the claim for damages (under Articles 393 and 750 of 
the KCC) as an ex post remedial measure. The Supreme Court suggests 
current ‘existence’ and ‘continuation’ as factors differentiating impediment 
from damages by holding that ‘impediment’, for purposes of the claim for 
eliminating an impediment against an ownership, is an infringement that 
continues to exist, while the concept of ‘damages’ is one that had occurred 
in the past and the infringement has since ended.33) In addition, the 
Supreme Court proposes that the criterion for determining the degree of 
impediment that should be afforded the protection of the law is ‘the 
tolerance threshold accepted as customary by social norms’.34)
32) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Du6213, May 31, 2002 (S. Kor.).
33) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da5917, Mar. 28, 2003 (S. Kor.). A more thorough analysis 
of this case is available in Kim Hyoung Seok, Soyumul Banghaebaeje Cheonggugwoneseo 
Banghaeui Gaenyeom [The Concept of Impediment in a Claim for Eliminating an Impediment against 
Ownership], 45(4) seoUldaehaGGyo beobhaG [seoUl law JoUrnal] 394, 394ff (2004).
34) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da64602, Sept. 13, 2004 (S. Kor.). The case involved the 
question of what constitutes an act of infringement on another’s interest to a view. The 
Supreme Court held that in order for an act of infringement against one’s protected interest to 
a view to constitute an offense, the extent of the infringement upon one’s interest to a view 
must exceed the tolerance threshold accepted as customary by social norms. The Court sets 
forth the criteria for determining whether that threshold has been exceeded and provides 
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In light of the standard of construction discussed above, the following 
elements characterize an act tending to impede another’s business activities 
and thus requiring a determination of illegality under the MRFTA. First, the 
conduct must assume the existence of a counterparty or a third party 
affected thereby and it must be about an aspect with a direct link to 
another’s business activities. Second, the conduct must have caused or has 
the risk of causing a harm to another that exceeds the tolerance threshold 
accepted as customary by social norms, or where there is a concern that the 
harm or the risk will continue to exist.
2)  Review of Conduct Elements of Non-Disclosure of Relevant Patent 
Information
Other than the general requirement of illegality of ‘unreasonableness’, 
the conduct of non-disclosure of relevant patent information, as prescribed 
in the IPR Guidelines, has as its objective element ‘the refusal to disclose 
information about the related patent application or registered patent owned 
by itself’ and has as its subjective element ‘the intention of increasing the 
possibility of being selected as a technical standard’ or ‘the object of 
avoiding prior consultation on license terms’. The counterparty to which 
such act of non-disclosure of relevant patent information is directed would 
be an SSO as such act is made in response to imposition of duty to disclose 
such information by the SSO.
Given, however, that an act of impeding another’s business activities 
requires the existence of a counterparty of the impeding act or a third party 
who is affected thereby, it remains unclear what the IPR Guidelines 
considers as ‘another’ whose business activities are affected by the 
impeding act. In order to argue that the non-disclosure of relevant patent 
information is the impeding act in itself, the SSO as a counterparty must 
have suffered a specific disadvantage due to the non-disclosure. Yet, the 
reason a SSO requires relevant patent information is not simply to collect 
relevant patent information but to use them in selecting technical standards 
and identify for its members the enterprises from which standard users 
may need a license. Thus, unless the standard-setting or the establishment 
factors to consider in making that determination.
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of intellectual property policies supporting the standard was impeded, the 
non-disclosure of relevant patent information cannot in and of itself 
establish an impeding act. Therefore, the specific conduct type as described 
in the IPR Guidelines omits a necessary element constituting an impeding 
act. In order to make up for this omission, additional conduct elements, 
such as an deceptive or coercive element of the act, that causes the SSO to 
include the patent holder’s technology as part of a technical standard or to 
preclude an opportunity to benefit from the application of the related 
intellectual property policies.
Furthermore, it would be incongruous under competition laws to 
consider a SSO as the party being affected by an impeding act since a SSO is 
not a business participating in the market but an entity created to oversee 
the standard-setting process. Thus, a meaningful regulation of an impeding 
act under competition laws would require that the party being affected by 
an impeding act is an existing or potential competitor or counterparty in the 
technology market of the standard or its downstream market for products. 
In this regard, in order to satisfy the element of an impeding act, a patent 
holder’s non-disclosure of relevant patent information must have 
precluded the owner of a competing technology from becoming part of a 
technical standard, or placed licensees at a disadvantage in negotiating 
license terms by avoiding the commitment to FRAND.
On the other hand, ‘purpose’, as a factor of subjective intention, is 
distinguished from ‘intent’, and the former means more specific and higher 
thought than the latter. Therefore, such purpose is hard to be found in the 
circumstances where a doer acknowledged the increased possibility of his 
or her patent being chosen as a technical standard or acknowledged the 
result of advance negotiation of licensing terms being avoided, but it can be 
found only in the circumstances where his or her deed was the fruit of 
prudent deliberation for such result.35) 
35) There is discrimination in favor of an affiliated company as a type of unfair trade 
practice where purpose is specified as a constituting factor. The Supreme Court interprets ‘for 
the advantage of an affiliated company’, which is a constituting factor for discrimination in 
favor of an affiliated company, as intention to give advantage to an affiliated company, and 
rules that such purpose is hard to be found in the circumstances where an enterprise’s 
affiliated company benefitted from his or her business activity for his or her own interest, but 
it can be found only in the circumstances where an enterprise’s main intention is to restrict 
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Accordingly, Section III.5. A of the IPR Guidelines which describes a 
failure to disclose relevant patent information as an act that can constitute a 
violation of the MRFTA should be amended to additionally require conduct 
elements that would make a failure to disclose relevant patent information 
to constitute an act impeding another’s business activities.
3. Imposition of Unreasonable Level of Royalty
1) Interpretation Standard and Scope of Price Setting
Although the elements of price setting as an abuse of market dominance 
can be deduced from Paragraph 1, Article 32 of the MRFTA and Paragraph 
1, Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree, a dearth of cases36) applying the 
provisions and academic discussions37) renders clarifying its standard of 
construction and definitional scope challenging. Two issues deserving 
review in interpretation are: first, whether price setting is limited to an act 
causing the price to change, or includes the initial pricing determination or 
price maintenance, and second, whether it is possible to specify regulatory 
standards in determining an excessive price level for products in general 
and intellectual property rights in particular.
With respect to the first issue, the statute specifically lists price 
determination, maintenance and change. On the other hand, the Enforcement 
Decree restricts the scope of price determination, maintenance and change 
to those instances of significant price increase or minimal decrease by 
specifying that price determination, maintenance or change is limited to ‘a 
significant rise or insignificant drop in the price of goods or cost of labor 
that is disproportionate to any change in supply-demand or the cost of 
competition in the market to which his or her affiliated company belongs and to reinforce the 
concentration of economic power of his or her business group, comprehensively considering 
the motive of the discrimination, nature of discriminatory effect, business practice, status of 
the affiliated company at that time, etc. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du12076, Dec. 9, 2004 
(S. Kor.).
36) No case law and only four KFTC decisions exist.
37) Relevant materials include Lee, supra note 8; See also Lee Ki Jong, Sijangjibaejeogjiwi 
Namyonghaengwiloseoui Gagyeognamyonggwa Chulgojojeol Haengwi [Excessive Pricing and 
Output Control as an Abuse of Dominance], 19(4) sanGsapanlyeyeonGU [commercial cases review] 
(2006).
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supply (limited to the level customary in the same or similar industry) and 
lacking a reasonable explanation.’ This provision must be understood to 
limit the definitional scope of price setting to an act of changing price that 
causes a significant rise or an insignificant drop in price in light of the facts 
that: the regulatory framework for abuse of market dominance is such that 
the statute provides an abstract, comprehensive definition and is further 
specified in steps in the Enforcement Decree or public notice as necessary; it 
is difficult to make an absolute determination that the price level is 
excessive; the Enforcement Decree also presumes a relative determination 
of comparing against the change in supply-demand or the cost of supply; 
and a direct price control or regulation should only be used in extraordinary 
circumstances that meet the strictest standards.38)39)
In regard to the second issue, the standard provided in the Enforcement 
Decree is a simple comparison of the change in supply-demand or cost of 
supply against the increase or decrease in price. It also qualifies the change 
in cost of supply to “the level customary in the same or similar industry,” 
thereby supplementing the standard for comparison markets. This 
methodology is similar to that employed in the United Brands case40) in 
which the European Court of Justice proposed a two-step review to 
determine whether the price level is excessive.  The first step involves 
verifying whether the difference between the production cost and the sale 
38) See Damien Neven & Miguel de la Mano, Economics at DG Competition 2009-2010, 37(4) 
review of indUstrial orGanization (2010). “Absent these broader policy considerations, 
idiosyncratic to the EU system of competition enforcement, a competition authority has good 
economic reasons not to encroach on the rights of a dominant firm to charge whatever prices 
or royalties the market would bear, provided the acquisition of such dominance was 
legitimate, for example, through R&D leading to a patent.”  See also  David Evans & Jorge 
Padilla, Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules, 1(1) JoUrnal of 
competition law and economics 97-122 (2005), which sets forth the premise for the necessity of 
exploitation and abuse regulation on exceptionally excessive pricing.
39) The two-level analysis asserted in Lee, supra note 8, at 139 is an overexpansion that 
goes beyond what the text of the statute supports: Lee argues that price determination, 
maintenance or change in the statute refers to the appearance or form of price setting and that 
the increase or decrease in price in the Enforcement Decree in practice refer to the rise in price 
over the competitive level due to price setting.
40) Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v Commission, 1978 ECR 207. For more information 
on the case, see Damien Geradin, Abusive Pricing in an IP Licensing Context: an EC Competition 
Law Analysis (June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996491. 
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price of a product is excessive. The second step is determining whether the 
sale price is fair in itself or in comparison to other competing products. 
However, this analysis is problematic due to the fact that without a precise 
economic measure to determine whether a given price is ‘excessive’ or 
‘fair’, such standards are inherently vague and devoid of meaning.41) More 
troublesome is the fact that, with respect to the calculation of royalty, 
determining a reasonable profit margin or comparing against similar 
competing products may be altogether extremely difficult.42)
2)  Review of Conduct Elements of Imposition of Unreasonable Level of Royalty
The IPR Guidelines Chapter III, Article 5, Paragraph A lists ‘an act of 
unfairly discriminating the license terms for standard essential patents, or 
of imposing royalty at an unreasonable level.’ This type of act might 
include conduct of a patent holder, who made a commitment to the SSO to 
FRAND terms during the process of technology standard establishment, in 
violation of the commitment after his or her patent has been selected as the 
standard. However, the IPR Guidelines also apply this type of act to widely 
used standard technologies that it appears to be regarded as de facto 
standard technologies as well as to SSO-selected standard technologies, and 
thus it does not seem to be limited only to the SSO-selected standard 
technologies. While the IPR Guidelines Chapter III, Paragraph 1 specifies 
imposition of substantially unreasonable level of licensing fee, 
discriminatory licensing fee, and unreasonable terms with respect to 
licensing generally, the types of conduct specified herein should be based 
on the special circumstances where the patent is included in a technology 
standard.  
The issue here is whether the regulated conduct has the aspects of the 
problematic conduct pursuant to the competition law under such special 
circumstances. There is a risk of finding a violation of the MRFTA simply 
because the conduct corresponds to the enumerated conduct specified in 
41) Geradin, supra note 40.
42) A more detailed explanation is available in Kwon Namhoon & Hong Dae Sik, 
Jisigjaesangwone Daehan Silsilyoui Sujungwa Gyeongjaengbeobui Yeoghal [Royalty Rates for 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Role of Antitrust Law], 15(2) JeonGbobeobhaG [JoUrnal of 
Korea information law] (Aug. 2011). 
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the IPR Guidelines Chapter III. 5 and such conduct is related to non-
compliance with the disclosure requirement or the FRAND commitment. 
Therefore, in order to separately regulate such specified conduct related to 
standards which is distinguished from the specified conduct related to the 
licensing generally, the IPR Guidelines needs to provide separate and 
specific requirements related to such conduct. More specifically, the specific 
requirements need the factors which show unfair competition which is not 
related to legitimate means of competition such as price, quality, service, 
etc.43)
Another problem is that the IPR Guidelines uses an extremely abstract 
concept of ‘unreasonableness’. It appears that the KFTC borrowed this 
language from the terms that are ‘Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory 
(FRAND)’ on which SSOs request owners of patents included in standards 
to commit to license such patents. However, while enterprises may choose 
to use abstract terms to create and enforce obligations between them under 
contract law, it is certainly inappropriate to use such an abstract term in the 
KFTC’s internal regulation which is enforceable in cases brought by the 
government through the imposition of administrative fines and other relief. 
In such cases, a regulation is supposed to clarify the language of the law 
and identify more specifically the types of conduct prohibited by law, to 
give the enterprises subject to the law reasonably specific notice of the 
conduct from which it must refrain to avoid government sanctions. Given 
that the Enforcement Decree recognizes the difficulty of determining 
exploitative pricing and tries to provide in as much detail as possible by 
suggesting a benchmark for ‘the ordinary level of change of demand and 
supply or costs for supply in the same or similar industry’, the IPR 
Guidelines’ provision regarding unreasonable royalty should be subject to 
the strict critique.  
43) In order to explain the competition by desirable competition methods, ‘Competition 
on the Merits’ is used in the U.S., and ‘Leistungswetbewerb’ (‘Performance Competition’ in 
English) is used in Germany. Its meaning is not properly understood if translated into English 
since Leistungswetbewerb is the unique idea originating from the German tradition, which 
values the freedom of the economic activities. Even though the EU member states except 
Germany are abandoning this idea, some of the influential scholars in Korea still support this 
idea. 
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V.  Review of Criteria for Determining Illegality of Exercise 
of Standard-related Patents
1. Overview
An illegality standard provides a normative framework which 
determines whether the conduct in question would constitute the content of 
illegality and cause such effects. The illegality standard under the MRFTA 
generally appears as a form of legal framework to determine whether the 
conduct in question satisfies the ‘unreasonable’ element. Ultimately, the 
illegality standard is established through court decisions. Korean courts 
principally establish the legal framework in a totality of circumstances 
manner, and consider relevant factors. The reason why the courts apply the 
totality of circumstances test is because the nature of illegality under the 
MRFTA is more likely to be based on a ‘standard’, rather than a ‘rule’. 
Illegality standards may be established for the comprehensive conduct 
types under the MRFTA or for the detailed conduct types under the 
Enforcement Decree or Guidelines. We may call the former a ‘general 
standard’ and the latter a ‘conduct-specific standard’. While the general 
standard provides a general principle and the common elements for the 
illegality standards, the conduct-specific standard consists of additional 
elements to be considered under a specific circumstance and elements to be 
considered more important, and then clarifies the relationship or priority 
among the factors or the relationship between the factors and the law or 
economy. 
In the National Agricultural Cooperative Foundation case, the Supreme 
Court advanced a conduct-specific standard.44) In this case, the conduct in 
question allegedly constituted ‘an act of the condition on the counterparty 
not trading with a competitor’ (Article 5, Section 5, Item 2 of the Enforcement 
Decree), which is a specific conduct in the context of the ‘act of 
unreasonable exclusion of competitors’ (Article 3-2, Section 1, Item 5 of the 
MRFTA).45) The Supreme Court cited the factors from a series of court cases 
44) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Du22078, July 9, 2009 (S. Kor.).
45) The Abuse Guidelines provides that factors to be taken into comprehensive 
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dealing with unreasonable exclusionary conduct,46)47) and presented 
additional factors, such as: the market share of the market dominant 
enterprise; the degree of the act of hampering market entry or expansion of 
the competitors and increased costs thereof; as well the trade terms. These 
additional factors are viewed as a ‘conduct-specific standard’ for the 
‘conduct of trading on the exclusivity condition’.
Particularly, by considering the degree of hampering market entry or 
expansion of competitors and increased costs, the Supreme Court made 
clear that the anti-competitive effect of the act of trading on the exclusivity 
condition is connected with the foreclosure effect to competitors, which 
reflects its economic understanding of elements indicating illegality of the 
act of trading on the exclusivity condition with characteristics of 
exclusionary abuse.48)
consideration relating to the act of trading on the exclusivity condition include whether the 
competitor would be easily able to find substitutes, purpose of trading, terms, counterparty to 
whom the conduct is directed and distribution practice of the industry (Article IV, Section 5 
Item 2). However, these factors do not sufficiently reflect the characteristics of the act of 
trading under the condition to exclude competitors to be deemed an act of abuse of market 
dominance.  Therefore, the illegality elements of trading to exclude competitors of the 
Enforcement Decree were applied to the illegality determination process. 
46) Factors for consideration included: background and motive of the interference with 
business activities of others, specifics of an act of interference with business activities of 
others, characteristics of the relevant market, degree of disadvantages suffered by the 
counterparty, changes in relevant market price and production yields, impeded innovations 
and decrease of diversity: Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du8626, Nov. 22, 2007 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Posco Case]; Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Du7465, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter T-Broad Case]; Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Du17707, Apr. 8, 2010 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Hyundai Motor Case]; Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Du22078, July 9, 2009 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Kia Motor Case].
47) Common factors for consideration used in the illegality standard for an act of 
interfering with the business activities of others include: purpose and specifics of the trading; 
change of the price or product yields in the relevant market; existence of similar products and 
adjacent market; impediment of innovation and diversity. It appears that the degree of the 
disadvantages suffered by the counterparty was not included as factors for consideration, 
since it is not a particular conduct element to constitute an act of interference of business 
activities of others.
48) Hong Dae Sik, Baejejeog Namyonghaengwie Daehan Wibeobseong Pandangijun [The 
Criteria for Determining Illegality of Exclusionary Abuse], in banbUpaewa GonGJeonGGeolaeJedo 
[The Systems for Anticorruption and Fair Trade] (Kang Chul-Kyu ed., 2011). 
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2. Review of Conduct-specific standards in the IPR Guidelines
There are particular issues with regard to the illegality determination 
standard in Section III. 5 of the IPR Guidelines where it stipulates that 
whether a patent holder has disclosed relevant patent information and 
satisfied FRAND commitment is to be an important consideration in 
determining unreasonableness. Under a normative perspective, this 
guideline is understood to stipulate additional factors to be considered over 
general factors in determining illegality. 
However, additional factors in the conduct-specific standard have to 
complement the factors in the general standard under a specific 
circumstance, in order to determine illegality on a totality of circumstances 
basis; they are decisive factors to determine the illegality. Thus, it is very 
unusual to emphasize certain factors which have meaning only within a 
specific circumstance. Moreover, to regard these particular factors as being 
decisive as to determine illegality or possibly being applied as more 
important elements, the relationship between these factors and illegality 
must be established. However, as the KFTC has little experience regulating 
such conduct so far, it is unjustifiable. 
Procedures on ‘disclosure of patent information’ and ‘FRAND 
commitment’ are contractual measures requested of the patent holders by 
SSOs in order to improve the standard-setting process and reduce the 
potential for ex post opportunism. In this regard, whether these procedures 
will be performed may be relevant on whether the standard-setting process 
is effective from the contractual standpoint of view or what kind of relief to 
be provided to a violation of the procedures under contract law. However, 
it is difficult to see how these kinds of factors are necessarily relevant in 
determining illegality under the MRFTA, such as business interference. 
As there is no basis to conclude that these factors, which have relevance 
in contract law and in the standard-setting process and licensing stage, 
have a close relationship with the illegality standard under MRFTA, the 
IPR Guidelines providing that whether such performances of procedures 
are important factors in determining abuse of patent rights have the risk to 
over-expanding the MRFTA in areas concerning private relationships. They 
can be better served as conduct elements to determine whether to fall 
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within the specific conduct type rather than as conduct-specific illegality 
factors to determine illegality of patent right exercise. Even when 
considered as conduct elements, they must be considered not because they 
were simply performed, but instead by limiting to situations where they 
were intentionally omitted or falsely performed, thereby affecting the 
standard-setting or licensing. Also, it is still possible to list them as one of 
the supplementary factors to be considered for the conduct-specific 
illegality standard to the extent that they contain assessment element as 
opposed to factual element. However, they can be neither the decisive nor 
more important elements over other considerations such as whether the 
standard-related patent has essentiality.
Therefore, there is a need to amend this section by listing them as 
factors to be considered according to the general method of presenting a 
conduct-specific standard. In particular, even if the disclosure procedure 
and FRAND commitment are included as relevant factors, it is desirable to 
list this as one of the additional factors to be possibly considered in 
determining unreasonableness by limiting it to the situation where the 
intentional omission of performance of these procedures or false 
performance may affect the standard setting or the licensing. It should be 
noted that the weight of these factors should not be regarded as more 
important or decisive as compared to other factors taken into consideration 
in assessing illegality.  Therefore, the unreasonableness of exercise of patent 
rights related to a technology standard shall be determined separately and 
specifically upon comprehensive consideration of factors49) such as whether 
the procedures were intentionally omitted or falsely performed, whether 
the SSO selected the specific technology as standard or included the specific 
technology in the standard a result of such omission or false performance, 
whether an alternative competing technology existed, whether such 
existence of alternative competing technology affected the applicable 
standard setting decision of the SSO, the effect on the technology market 
related to the standard or on competition in the product market which uses 
49) This refers to the totality of the circumstances test adopted by the Supreme Court 
decisions. It does not mean that a violation may be found even if one or more of the listed 
factors do not exist. The listed factors should be considered in a balanced way to determine 
the effect on the competition and consumer welfare in the market.  
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the applicable technology standard, and whether the standard-related 
patent is regarded as an SEP with essentiality.
It should be noted that there are newly added conduct-specific 
standards applied to an SEP holder. In particular, the amended Guidelines 
impose a stricter rule on an SEP holder with FRAND commitment in 
seeking injunctive relief. It sets up the standard that non-performance of the 
obligation to negotiate the granting of license and filing for injunctive relief 
against a willing licensee would be important factors to be considered in 
determining whether the SEP holder’s seeking injunctive relief may be anti-
competitive. This standard is largely consistent with the recent developed 
theory focused on willing licensee and decisional practice of the European 
Union50) and its member states. Therefore, this standard can be considered 
acceptable compared with the recent practical developments in other 
jurisdictions.51)
VI. Summary and Conclusion
I will summarize my arguments here below.
(1)  The KFTC will use its guidelines as a primary framework to enforce 
the MRFTA by the KFTC officials even though it has no legislative 
basis; therefore, it is very important to carefully review its contents. 
(2)  Non-disclosure of relevant patent or patent application information 
may relate to an unreasonable interference with the business 
activities of other enterprises, a type of abuse of market dominance 
under the MRFTA, if the non-disclosing party knows that the patent 
or patent application may be relevant to the proposed standard but 
decides not to disclose it in order to influence the standard-setting 
process, and the standard would have been rejected or altered to 
50) Case C-170/13, Huawei v ZTE (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?num=C-170/13.
51) For the overview of applicability of Antitrust Laws to attempts to obtain injunctive 
relief with respect to FRAND-Encumbered SEPs in various jurisdictions, see Standard-Essential 
Patents and Injunctive Relief 13-20, Jones day (Apr. 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/
standards-essential_patents/. 
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exclude the patent or patent application had it been disclosed. 
Absent these findings, and unless the standard has become a 
prevailing standard, there is no unreasonable interference with the 
business activities of other enterprises under the MRFTA, because (i) 
the conduct would not directly relate to other enterprise’s business 
activities, and (ii) there would be no specific disadvantage exceeding 
a socially and generally accepted degree.  Given that, in order to 
regulate such non-disclosure of related patent technology under the 
MRFTA, the IPR Guidelines needs to specifically provide that both 
the intent of the non-disclosure and effect of the non-disclosure on 
the standard setting process are required. 
(3)  Discrimination in licensing terms may be related to unreasonable 
discrimination which is a specific type of interference with business 
activities of other enterprises, and the imposition of unreasonable 
royalties may be related to excessive pricing, both of which are the 
types of abuse of market dominance under the MRFTA. However, 
the purposes or motives of SSO’s policy requiring the patent holder 
whose technology is included in the technology standard to license 
pursuant to the FRAND terms are for various reasons and not so 
simple to be understood based on a single meaning. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to judge a breach of the FRAND commitment under 
contract law as a violation of the MRFTA without considering other 
significant factors such as whether SEP is involved and further 
reviewing whether such breach leads to the exclusion or foreclosure 
of competition under the MRFTA. In the similar context, due to the 
difficulty in determining a reasonable level for a price, the 
Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA regulates price changes only 
based on a comparison of the degree of change in supply and 
demand or costs and the degree of change in price of goods or 
services. In addition, the policy reflected in patent law is to allow the 
patent owner to charge the prices the market will bear, and thereby 
induce investment in risky R&D.  However, the IPR Guidelines falls 
short, neither taking these considerations into account, nor providing 
any specific factors or standards to determine unreasonable royalties 
under the special circumstances where the patented technology is 
included in a standard.
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(4)  The IPR Guidelines provides that the disclosure of the patent 
information and the ex ante negotiation for licensing terms are 
important factors to be considered in judging illegality and whether 
the applicable procedures have been complied with should be 
preferentially considered in judging the illegality of the specified 
types of conduct. However, such disclosure and negotiation 
procedures are by their nature a method under contract law to 
improve the technology standard-setting process and reduce the 
potential for ex post opportunism. Whether or not there was 
compliance with such procedures does not bear causation or close 
relationship with the violation of the MRFTA and failure to comply 
with such procedures should not be considered more seriously than 
other factors to judge the anti-competitive effect when exercising the 
patent rights related to the technology standard.  Also, even if 
compliance with the applicable procedures could be considered in 
determining illegality of conduct, it should be limited to cases where 
there has been an intentional failure to comply with the procedures 
or a false disclosure and commitment which is likely to affect the 
selection of the technology standard or the licensing of the patented 
technology included in the technology standard, and where the 
technology standard has become the prevailing standard. 
(5)  The amended Guidelines present the conduct-specific standard for 
an SEP holder with FRAND commitment seeking injunctive relief. It 
sets up the standard that non-performance of the obligation to 
negotiate the granting of license and filing for injunctive relief 
against a willing licensee would be important factors to be 
considered in determining whether the SEP holder’s filing for 
injunctive relief may be anti-competitive. This standard can be 
considered acceptable compared with the recent practical 
developments in other jurisdictions.

